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NO PRIOR EXPERIENCE DESIRED: 
VILLARREAL V. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO 
CO. AND THE SCOPE OF DISPARATE 
IMPACT CLAIMS UNDER THE ADEA 
NICHOLAS PIACENTE† 
INTRODUCTION 
The specter of discrimination continues to plague the job 
search process for millions of Americans.1  Whether in the form of 
overt discrimination, or vague criteria such as “fit,” the hiring 
practices of many firms still impose barriers to entry for discrete 
groups and deprive individuals of the opportunity to work in 
certain industries.2  In response to these barriers, Congress 
passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the cornerstone 
of federal employment discrimination law in the United States.3  
Since the enactment of Title VII, the endeavor to eradicate 
discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin” has transformed the way in which business is 
conducted, staff is managed, and job applicants are hired in 
America.4 
 
† Senior Staff, St. John’s Law Review, 2017; J.D. Candidate, 2018, St. John’s 
University School of Law; A.B., 2013, Princeton University. The Author would like to 
extend his gratitude to Professor Patricia Montana for her guidance and to the staff 
of the St. John’s Law Review, and to his family for their support.  
1 See KEVIN STAINBACK & DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, DOCUMENTING 
DESEGREGATION: RACIAL AND GENDER SEGREGATION IN PRIVATE-SECTOR 
EMPLOYMENT SINCE THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 155 (2012); Dorian T. Warren, Racial 
Inequality in Employment in Postracial America, in BEYOND DISCRIMINATION: 
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN A POSTRACIST ERA 135, 135 (Frederick C. Harris & Robert C. 
Lieberman, eds., 2013). 
2 See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, Claims of Age Bias Rise, But Standards of Proof are 
High, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/your-
money/trying-to-make-a-case-for-age-discrimination.html. 
3 See Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 255 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012)). 
4 See id.; see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1975) 
(noting that Congress intended for the protections of Title VII and the ADEA to 
function as a “spur or catalyst” compelling employers “to self-examine and to self-
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Recognizing the unique hurdles faced by older people in the 
workforce, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”) of 1967.5  The ADEA is viewed as a 
companion statute to Title VII, and in fact, derives much of its 
language and structure from that earlier law.6  In enacting the 
ADEA, the Ninetieth Congress took inspiration from the Wirtz 
Report,7 which noted that “employers for a variety of reasons 
seek young workers” to the disadvantage of more experienced 
individuals.8  Echoing these sentiments, the preamble to the 
ADEA conveys that its central purpose is “to prohibit arbitrary 
age discrimination in employment.”9  The ADEA is also intended 
“to promote employment of older persons based on their ability 
rather than age,” and “to help employers and workers find ways 
of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on 
employment.”10 
The ADEA has only become more relevant now that the 
American workforce is aging.11  More than half of Americans 
working today are over the age of forty.12  Likewise, the number 
of workers over the age of fifty-five continues to rise relative to 
 
evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, 
the last vestiges” of discrimination); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
5 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 
Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012)). 
6 See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (announcing “[i]n fact, the 
prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII”). The phrase, in 
haec verba, means “in these words,” and it refers to the use of texts verbatim in 
other texts. 
7 See W. Willard Wirtz, U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Older American Worker: Age 
Discrimination in Employment, Report of the Secretary of Labor to Congress Under 
Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1965), as reprinted in EEOC, Legislative 
History of the Age Discrimination in Employment Acts (1981). 
8 See id. 
9 29 U.S.C § 621(b) (2012). 
10 Id. 
11 See Mitra Toossi & Elka Torpey, Older Workers: Labor Force Trends and 
Career Options, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (May 2017), 
https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2017/article/older-workers.htm; see also Kenneth 
R. Davis, Age Discrimination and Disparate Impact: A New Look at an Age-Old 
Problem, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 361, 361 (2004/2005) (“As the generation of baby 
boomers approaches its fifties and sixties, it occupies every venue in the American 
workforce.”). 
12 See Employment Status of the Civilian, Noninstitutional Population by Age, 
Sex, and Race, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/c 
ps/cpsaat03.htm (last modified Jan. 19, 2018) (expressing the percentages of all 
employed people over forty years old, which when combined yields 54.5% of the total 
employed population). 
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younger age brackets.13  The Bureau of Labor Statistics projects 
that by 2024, the labor participation rate for people between the 
ages of fifty-five and sixty-four will grow by 2.2%, while the same 
rate for individuals aged sixty-five and older will grow by 3.1%.14  
Thus, the centrality of the ADEA in employment law has only 
increased since its enactment in the mid-1960s. 
While great strides have been made in combatting age 
discrimination since then, individuals over the age of forty still 
face patent and latent discrimination in the American labor 
market.15  This struggle has been particularly acute in the job 
search and interview process.  Recently, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co.,16 found that job applicants may bring disparate 
impact claims under the ADEA, making it the first federal 
appeallate court to recognize these claims for job seekers under 
the Act.17  However, after granting a rehearing en banc, the 
Eleventh Circuit reversed itself, in an 8-to-3 decision, holding 
that job applicants may not assert disparate impact claims under 
the ADEA.18  The plaintiff in Villarreal, a forty-nine-year-old 
 
13 See Ann Marie Tracey, Still Crazy After All These Years? The ADEA, the 
Roberts Court, and Reclaiming Age Discrimination as Differential Treatment, 46 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 607, 607 (2009). 
14 Civilian Labor Participation Rate by Age, Gender, Race and Ethnicity, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_table_303.htm 
(last modified Jan. 19, 2018). 
15 See Ashton Applewhite, You're How Old? We'll Be in Touch, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/opinion/sunday/youre-how-old-well-be-
in-touch.html (recounting a story about a man who overheard a prospective 
employer call him “too old” for an available position). 
16 Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (Villarreal II), 806 F.3d 1288 (11th 
Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 
(11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), rev’d en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 
137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
17 Id. at 1302–03. 
18 See Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (Villarreal III), 839 F.3d 958, 963 
(11th Cir. 2016). A claim for disparate treatment requires a demonstration of 
discriminatory intent, whereas disparate impact concerns practices which are 
ostensibly neutral on their face, but substantially impact a certain protected 
segment of society. The Supreme Court has articulated the distinctions: 
Disparate treatment . . . is the most easily understood type of 
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than 
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . . 
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress 
“disparate impact.” The latter involve employment practices that are 
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall 
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man, applied for a regional sales manager position with R.J. 
Reynolds, but his application was repeatedly denied despite his 
years of sales experience.19  The Supreme Court in Smith v. City 
of Jackson first announced that disparate impact protections are 
cognizable under the ADEA,20 but the ruling only addressed 
current employees, not job applicants.21 
This Note argues that § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA permits 
disparate impact claims for job applicants, despite the revised 
holding of the Eleventh Circuit.  First, the plain meaning of 
§ 4(a)(2) strongly suggests that disparate impact protections lie 
for job seekers, in contrast to the Eleventh Circuit’s ultimate 
finding.  This argument draws on a close textual and structural 
analysis of the ADEA, supplemented with a comparative analysis 
to Title VII.22  Furthermore, this Note unpacks the legal 
arguments surrounding the 1972 amendment to Title VII, 
demonstrating that the absence of the “applicants for 
employment” language from § 4(a)(2) does not restrict the scope 
of disparate impact theory to current employees under the 
ADEA.  This reflects the robust case law to suggest otherwise, as 
well as the practical limitations of the congressional override  
 
 
more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by 
business necessity. 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
19 See Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1291. Mr. Villarreal brought an action for age 
discrimination pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 623, the disparate impact provision of the 
ADEA. This section of the ADEA provides, “It shall be unlawful for an 
employer . . . to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would 
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because such individual's age.” 
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012). 
20 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
21 See id. at 240. Previously, the Seventh, Eighth and Tenth circuits have denied 
job applicants the right to assert disparate impact claims under the ADEA, but these 
rulings date from the early to mid-1990s. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 
F.3d 1466, 1470 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1007 
n.12 (10th Cir. 1996); E.E.O.C. v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1077–78 
(7th Cir. 1994). However, Smith overruled both Ellis and Francis W. Parker School, 
rendering this circuit split less fractious. 
22 By comparison, Title VII recognizes disparate impact protections for both job 
applicants and current employees. The difference, in part, derives from a key textual 
difference between the two statutes. In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to provide 
an express provision for job applicants—“his employees or applicants for 
employment . . . ,” while Congress has not revisited the ADEA to insert the same 
language to § 4(a)(2). See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 
92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 109 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012)). 
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amendment as a legislative device, which evidences very little if 
any congressional intent to distinguish between closely related 
statutes. 
I. VILLARREAL V. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO.: FACTUAL 
BACKGROUND AND LEGAL ARGUMENTS OF THE NORTHERN 
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA AND THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Richard M. Villarreal applied for a Territory Manager 
position with R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (“RJR”) on 
November 8, 2007.23  At the time, he was forty-nine years old.24  
The Territory Manager job was a sales position, and Villarreal 
had more than eight years of sales experience when he applied.25 
Almost three years later, Villarreal applied for the Territory 
Manager position again, in June 2010.26  Unlike in 2007, 
Villarreal received prompt notification from RJR that his 
application had been rejected.27  He applied for the same position 
in December 2010, May 2011, September 2011, and March 
2012.28  None of Villarreal’s applications led to a job interview, or 
any other further employment action.29 
Between 2007 and 2012, RJR contracted with two recruiting 
companies, Kelly Services, Inc. and Pinstripe, to review 
applications and forward résumés to its human resources office.30  
To assist Kelly Services in selecting résumés, RJR provided it 
with specific guidelines of “what to look for on a resume,” 
“targeted candidate” qualities, and characteristics to “stay away 
from.”31  Among the desired attributes were “2-3 years out of 
college” and “adjusts easily to changes.”32  Among the disfavored 
qualities was “8-10 years” of sales experience.33  RJR also 
 
23 Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (Villarreal I), No. 2:12-CV-0138-RWS, 
2013 WL 823055, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 6, 2013), rev'd and remanded, 806 F.3d 1288 
(11th Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 
635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), rev’d en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at *2. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at *1. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at *1. 
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provided Pinstripe with certain criteria, largely based on the 
attributes of recent hires who had earned the status of “Blue 
Chip Territory Manager.”34  Of the new hires who had attained 
the Blue Chip accolade, only nine percent had six or more years 
of sales experience.35 
Between September 2007 and March 2008, Kelly Services 
received 19,086 applications for Territory Manager position, with 
9,100 originating from applicants with eight or more years of 
sales experience.36  Kelly Services only submitted fifteen percent 
of the latter group’s applications to RJR for further review, 
compared to thirty-five percent of those applications with less 
professional experience.37  Similar return rates occurred when 
Pinstripe screened a total of 25,729 applications, of which 12,727 
originated from candidates with more than ten years of 
experience.38  Yet, Pinstripe referred just 7.7% of this subset to 
RJR, compared to forty-five percent of applicants with less than 
three years of experience.39  In total, RJR hired 1,024 individuals 
for the Territory Manger position between September 2007 and 
July 2010; and just nineteen were over the age of forty, or 1.9%.40 
Villarreal brought an action for discrimination under the 
ADEA on behalf of “all applicants for the Territory manager 
position who applied for the position since the date RJR began its 
pattern or practice of discriminating against applicants over the 
age of 40.”41  He asserted claims for both intentional age 
discrimination, or disparate treatment under 
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), and the unlawful use of hiring standards 
 
34 Id. at *2. RJR management nominated a number of recent hires as “ideal” 
Blue Chip sales force employees. Id. Statistically speaking, sixty-seven percent of 
the Blue Chip employees had between zero and three years of work experience. 
Among this group, just nine percent had six or more years of relevant experience. Id. 
Their characteristics formed the criteria which Pinstripe used to filter applicants. Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at *2. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at *3. Mr. Villarreal filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on May 17, 2010. Id. He did not file 
with the EEOC until 2010 because he was awaiting a response to his 2007 
application. Id. The EEOC issued a Right to Sue letter on April 2, 2012. Id. These 
facts are relevant to the equitable tolling claim Mr. Villarreal asserted alongside his 
disparate impact claim. This Note does not address this aspect of the Villarreal 
litigation. 
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that discriminated against individuals over the age of forty, or 
disparate impact under 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2).42  Specifically, 
§ 4(a)(2) of the ADEA, the disparate impact provision, provides, 
“It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to limit, segregate, or 
classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because such 
individual’s age.”43 
In response, the District Court granted RJR’s motion to 
dismiss.44  On substantive grounds, the District Court concluded 
that under the ADEA, only current employees can bring 
disparate impact claims, pursuant to Smith v. City of Jackson.45  
Until then, the Supreme Court had only recognized disparate 
impact claims for current employees or rehires, not job 
applicants.46 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court’s 
holding that only current employees can bring disparate impact 
claims under the ADEA, finding instead that § 4(a)(2) of the 
ADEA supports disparate impact protections for job applicants.47 
Overall, Judge Martin’s opinion consisted of a three-part 
inquiry, addressing various substantive arguments asserted by 
Villarreal.  In the first part, Judge Martin evaluated the 
language of the statute and the competing interpretations offered 
by the litigants.48  RJR insisted that § 4(a)(2) only pertains to 
current employees, given the clause, “to limit, segregate, or 
classify his employees.”49  However, Mr. Villarreal argued that 
the object of the verbs limit, segregate, and classify is “any 
individual,” so the presence of “his employees” earlier in the 
 
42 See id. 
43 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012). 
44 See Villarreal I, 2013 WL 823055, at *8. As an initial matter, the court denied 
Villarreal's claims originating before November 2009, dismissing them as time-
barred. Id. at *7–8. The EEOC mandates that claimants file their complaints within 
180 days of receiving a Right to Sue letter. Villarreal's claims dating back to 
November 2007 clearly fell outside this window of time. Id. at *2. 
45 See id. at *5. 
46 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 230–31 (2005); E.E.O.C. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 528 F.3d 1042, 1047 (8th Cir. 2008). 
47 See Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1290, 1301. Prior to filing his appeal, Villarreal 
also moved to amend his complaint, to include additional details to justify his delay 
and persuade the court to grant his request for equitable tolling. Id. at 1292. 
48 See id. at 1292–93. 
49 See id. at 1293 (emphasis added). 
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provision pertains to an employer’s selection of “any individuals” 
to be “his employees.”50  Judge Martin determined that § 4(a)(2) 
is reasonably susceptible to both interpretations, and a plain 
reading was inconclusive.51 
The second part of the opinion analyzed the relationship 
between § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA and § 2000e-2(a)(2) of Title VII, 
the provision on which § 4(a)(2) is based.52  As an initial matter, 
the Court acknowledged that the language of the two statutes is 
identical, with the exception of four words.53  In 1972, Congress 
amended § 2000e-2(a)(2) to include the phrase “or applicants for 
employment.”54  To date, Congress has not inserted “applicants 
for employment” into § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA.55  Despite this 
difference, the Eleventh Circuit did not consider this absence to 
be dispositive, sidestepping the holding in Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services.56  Judge Martin opined that “[w]e will not 
assume that Congress chose not to pass legislation modifying the 
ADEA simply because it did make this one change in a broader 
restructuring of Title VII.”57  This stance departed from that of 
the District Court, which compared the twin provisions of the 
ADEA and Title VII.58  Precisely because § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA 
lacks the language “or applicants for employment,” the District 
 
50 See id. 
51 Id. 
52 See id. at 1295. 
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012). In particular, Title VII language of 
§ 703(a)(2) provides, “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
54 See Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1295. 
55 Id. 
56 See id. at 1295–96; see also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 
(2009). The District Court had in fact relied on Gross, and its seminal line, “[w]hen 
Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have 
acted intentionally.” Id. at 174. See discussion infra notes 135–160 and 
accompanying text. 
57 Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1296. Judge Martin also attended to the legislative 
history and purpose of the ADEA to determine whether disparate impact claims 
extend to job applicants. She acknowledged that Congress enacted the ADEA in 
order to “promote employment of older persons”—29 U.S.C. § 621(b)—and to assist 
peoples over the age of forty in their efforts “to regain employment when displaced 
from jobs”—29 U.S.C. § 621(a). But the Eleventh Circuit declined to infer from these 
statements that a cause of action may lie for job applicants under § 4(a)(2). 
58 See Villarreal I, 2013 WL 823055, at *5–6. 
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Court denied the claim that the ADEA supports disparate impact 
claims for job applicants.59  Instead, the Eleventh Circuit held 
that disparate impact claims could be available under the ADEA 
despite the textual disparity with Title VII.60 
Following the portions on statutory interpretation and 
legislative history, the third and final part of the Eleventh 
Circuit’s opinion addressed agency deference, and whether such 
an analysis could resolve the dispute over disparate impact 
claims for job applicants under the ADEA.61  First, Judge Martin 
noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) stipulates in 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c) that “[a]ny 
employment practice that adversely affects individuals within 
the protected age group on the basis of older age is 
discriminatory unless the practice is justified by a ‘reasonable 
factor other than age.’ ”62  For the Eleventh Circuit, this 
represented the official agency interpretation of § 4(a)(2).63  In 
fact, the EEOC filed an amicus brief on behalf of Mr. Villarreal 
endorsing this reading of § 1625.7(c).64  Relying on the Chevron 
deference standard, the court concluded that disparate impact 
claims extend to job applicants under § 4(a)(2).65 
By contrast, in his dissent, Judge Vinson maintained that 
the absence of the “applicants for employment” language from 
the ADEA indicated that disparate impact claims only pertain to 
current employees.66 
 
 
59 See id. 
60 Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1293–95. 
61 See id. at 1299. The Eleventh Circuit was quite explicit in disclosing its 
methodology: “Because the text of § 4(a)(2) does not clearly resolve the issue in this 
case, we ask the question we must when faced with a vague statute: has the agency 
tasked with enforcing the statute given a reasonable reading?” Id. at 1298. 
62 See Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1299 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c) (2017)). 
63 Id. at 1299–1300. 
64 Id. at 1303. RJR resisted this finding by arguing that 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c) 
only pertained to the reasonable factor other than age defense (“RFOA”), discussed 
extensively in Smith, and in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory. In Smith, 
four justices concluded that the RFOA defense, itself, suggests that disparate impact 
claims are cognizable under the ADEA. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 
246 (2005). 
65 See Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1299. 
66 See id. at 1308–09 (Vinson, J., dissenting). 
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On February 10, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit granted a 
rehearing en banc, thus vacating the judgment.67  On October 5, 
2016, an en banc panel overruled the initial Eleventh Circuit 
holding, finding 8-to-3 that disparate impact protections are 
restricted to current employees under the ADEA.68  Judge Pryor 
authored the majority opinion.69  While concurring in the 
judgment, Judge Jordan filed an opinion presenting his own 
interpretation of § 4(a)(2), as did Judge Rosenbaum.70  Judge 
Martin filed a dissent, which Judges Jordan and Rosenbaum 
joined with respect to the equitable tolling issue, but not the 
disparate impact claim.71 
Judge Pryor adopted a plain reading of the statute to 
conclude that the ADEA does not authorize disparate impact 
claims for job applicants.72  The grammatical construction of 
§ 4(a)(2) proved essential to this finding, specifically the final 
clause, “or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee.”73  Under Judge Pryor’s approach, the preceding 
portions of § 4(a)(2) are subordinate to this residual, functionally 
supreme phrase, such that the individual asserting a claim under 
§ 4(a)(2) must already be an employee to enjoy its protections.74  
Judge Pryor also distinguished Griggs v. Duke Power Co. by 
noting that Griggs concerned “promotion and transfer policies,” 
not the “ ‘hiring criteria’ for fist-time applicants.”75  His opinion 
declined to compare § 4(a)(2) to the analogous provision of Title 
VII, § 703(a)(2), because “we do not consider legislative history 
when the text is clear.”76 
Judge Jordan filed a concurrence, objecting to Judge Pryor’s 
reductive interpretation rendering the § 4(a)(2) functionally 
dormant except for the final clause, “or otherwise adversely affect 
 
67 See Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800, 
at *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016). 
68 Villarreal III, 839 F.3d 958, 963 (11th Cir. 2016). 
69 Id. at 962–73. 
70 Id. at 973–75 (Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 
975–81 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
71 Id. at 981–93 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
72 See id. at 963–64 (majority opinion). 
73 See id. 
74 See id. 
75 Id. at 968–69. See also infra notes 189–198 and accompanying text for further 
detail on Griggs. 
76 Villareal III, 839 F.3d at 969. 
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his status as an employee.”77  Rather, Judge Jordan focused on 
the key phrase “any individual,” noting the tension between “any 
individual” and “employee” or “employees” elsewhere in 
§ 4(a)(2).78  Preferring to read the provision as a functional whole, 
Judge Jordan found that job seekers could bring disparate impact 
claims, but only if the alleged discriminatory practice also 
affected current employees at the same time.79 
At the same time, Judge Rosenbaum concurred with Judge 
Pryor’s interpretation, and elaborated even further on the 
importance of the word “otherwise” as the operative term of 
§ 4(a)(2).80  Furthermore, he engaged in a Whole Act Rule 
analysis, observing those places within the ADEA where the 
phrase “applicant for employment” appears, such as in § 4(a)(3), 
to highlight its absence from § 4(a)(2).81  Judge Rosenbaum did 
acknowledge the 1972, post-Griggs amendment to Title VII.82  
Still, he argued that the Griggs ruling, announced before the 
“applicants for employment” language was added to Title VII, 
was unavailing because the 1972 amendment had languished in 
Congress from 1967 until its formal enactment in 1972.83 
Dissimilarly, Judge Martin, in her dissent, offered 
alternative bases for finding disparate impact protections for job 
seekers under the ADEA.84  Notably, Judge Martin began with a 
discussion of the Griggs decision, observing that “[t]he text of the 
ADEA that we interpret here is identical to the text the Supreme 
Court interpreted in Griggs.”85  Martin raised other salient  
 
 
77 See id. at 973–74 (Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
78 See id. at 974. 
79 See id. (“If we are trying to give effect to both critical terms—'his employees' 
and 'any individual'—the reading that makes the most sense to me is that a job 
applicant ('any individual') can bring an ADEA claim under a disparate impact 
theory, but only if something the employer has done vis-à-vis 'his employees' violates 
the ADEA by 'limit[ing], segregat[ing] or classify[ing]' those employees. So, if any 
employer's practice with respect to his employees violates the ADEA, and that same 
practice has a disparate impact on job applicants, those applicants can sue under 
§ 623(a)(2).”). 
80 See id. at 975–77 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
81 Id. at 977–78. 
82 See id. at 979–80. 
83 See id. at 979. 
84 See id. at 981–93 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
85 Id. at 981. 
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points, such as the key term of “any individual,” and the original 
draft bill for the ADEA, which substituted this term for the 
originally much narrower, “his employees.”86 
Absent from the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc opinion was any 
discussion of Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., which had 
been previously addressed in the District Court and first 
Eleventh Circuit opinions.87  In fact, there was no mention of 
Gross whatsoever throughout the Eleventh Circuit’s revisited 
ruling. 
II. PARSING THE STATUTE: THE CURRENT TEXT OF THE ADEA 
AND DISPARATE IMPACT PROTECTIONS FOR JOB APPLICANTS 
A. Roadmap to the Legal Arguments 
Despite the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning, the text of § 4(a)(2) 
itself authorizes disparate impact protections for job applicants.  
In the following two Parts, this Note offer two justifications for 
this finding.  First, the plain meaning of § 4(a)(2) enables 
disparate impact protections for job seekers.  Second, the case 
law and legislative history of the ADEA confirms this 
interpretation, independent of the plain meaning of the statute.  
This precedential record supports the contention that disparate 
impact protections lie for applicants. 
This Part examines the language, grammar, and syntax of 
§ 4(a)(2) to conclude that its text suggests that job applicants, as 
well as current employees, may enjoy disparate impact 
protections.  Once again, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) reads: 
It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to limit, segregate, or 
classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual’s age.88 
Overall, in the next Section, this Note demonstrates that § 4(a)(2) 
is sensitive to the myriad forms of employment discrimination 
based on age.  Operating from this assumption, it illustrates that 
the text of § 4(a)(2) is deliberately expansionist, because the 
 
86 Id. at 981–82. The following is a keen rebuke: “The majority never explains 
why Congress chose the term 'any individual' in § 4(a)(2) if it really meant 
'employee.’ ” Id. at 984. 
87 See generally Villarreal III, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016). 
88 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012). 
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provision speaks of “any” action that “deprive[s]” and merely 
practices that “tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities.”89  Therefore, the ADEA enables job seekers to 
bring disparate impact claims, along with current employees. 
B. Plain Meaning of Section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA 
First, the use of the word “any” in § 4(a)(2), which appears 
twice in the provision, strongly recommends that disparate 
impact claims lie for job applicants.  Here, Congress used the 
word “any” to modify the modes of discrimination prohibited by 
the law—“any way”—as well as the grammatical objects of 
discrimination—“any individual.”  On the face of the statute, the 
placement and operation of the word “any” fails to impose 
restrictions on the application of the statute, namely to current 
employees alone.  In addition, the word “individual” is modified 
by the prepositional phrase of “of employment opportunities.”  
Read altogether, the statute ostensibly refers to “any individual” 
“deprive[d]” of “employment opportunities” in “any way.”  Based 
on this simple reading alone, the statute seems to apply to “any 
individual,” not just current employees. 
As well, the syntax of the simplified phrase, “to 
limit . . . employees,” indicates that job seekers may assert 
disparate impact protections.  The prohibition of “to 
limit . . . employees” refers to discriminatory practices that have 
the effect of excluding individuals from employment on the basis 
of age.  Read in this way, the statute plainly prohibits actions 
that “limit . . . employees . . . because of such individual’s age.”  
The use of “limit” in conjunction with “his employees,” strongly 
suggests that the provision contemplates practices that 
disparately impact older job seekers.  The relationship between 
the verb “limit” and the object “his employees,” focuses on 
potential actions that bar individuals from employment 
opportunities on the basis of age.90  This central concern is echoed 
later in the key phrasing of “employment opportunities 
or . . . status as an employee.”  Accordingly, the operative syntax  
 
 
89 See id. 
90 To be sure, the next two verbs, segregate and classify, refer to acts that 
pertain to both current employees, as well as applicants. Nevertheless, the 
simplified phrase of “limit . . . his employees” clearly contemplates the employee 
selection process—that is, job applicants. 
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of § 4(a)(2) repeatedly prohibits actions that restrict employment 
opportunities, implying that job applicants are covered by the 
ADEA’s conception of disparate impact. 
Moreover, Congress notably selected the expansive “any 
individual,” instead of specifying “any employee” at the end of the 
clause, “which would deprive or tend to deprive.”  An early draft 
of § 4(a)(2) restricts the object of the operative verbs to 
“employees.”  The provision was originally constructed as “limit, 
segregate, or classify employees so as to deprive them of 
employment opportunities or adversely affect their status.”91  But 
in its current form, the statute eschews this far narrower 
language, with employees as the direct object, in favor of “any 
individual.”  Furthermore, Congress eliminated the 
demonstrative pronouns of “them” and “their” referring back to 
“employees” found in its initial draft.92  Clearly, the drafters 
preferred the language “any individual,” a deliberately broad 
approach.  Likewise, Congress could have employed language 
like “such employees,” recalling the direct object of “his 
employees.”93  Instead, the statute refers to “any individual,” a 
telling choice.  Thus, whatever the meaning of “any individual,” it 
must mean something more than just current employees. 
In addition to the words “any individual,” other aspects of 
§ 4(a)(2) also recommend an expansive understanding of the 
statute’s scope.  The provision begins with the broadly worded, 
“limit, segregate, or classify.”  It does not just condemn acts that 
“segregate,” but also those that may simply “limit or classify” 
individuals on the basis of age.  Furthermore, the various clauses 
of § 4(a)(2) logically function in unison, such that the “limit, 
segregate, or classify” phrase distributes across the whole of the 
provision.  Under this reading, the later phrase “deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities” operates reflectively, 
 
91 See Villareal II, 806 F.3d 1288, 1298 n.8 (11th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in 
original), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 
(11th Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 
2292 (2017).  
92 See id. 
93 En Banc Brief for AARP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 
10, Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-
10602), 2016 WL 1376063, at *10. Oddly, RJR submitted this evidence, arguing that 
§ 4(a)(2) is principally concerned with current employees. However, the choice of 
Congress to abandon this language, in favor of more expansive language, suggests 
the opposite: § 4(a)(2) at the very least encompasses some group besides current 
employees, whether or not it be job applicants, or perhaps past employees. 
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prohibiting employers from instituting practices that “limit, 
segregate, or classify” employees “which would deprive any 
individual . . . of employment opportunities.”  Crucially, this 
reading adopts a global as opposed to a segmented interpretation 
of the statute. 
Along with this theme, the absence of any explicit mention of 
job applicants in § 4(a)(2) is immaterial, because the tenor of the 
statute is broad and inclusive.  In fact, the absence permits its 
protections to apply even more broadly than if job seekers were 
explicitly mentioned.  Enumerating job applicants would exclude 
other classes of peoples by operation of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius.94  For example, contractors or temporary 
employees may not qualify as a protected class if the statute were 
to itemize job applicants and current employees.95  This lack of 
exclusive specificity in § 4(a)(2) authorizes the maximalist 
purpose of the provision to reach a wide class of potential 
litigants. 
The penultimate clause of § 4(a)(2) affirms the maximalist 
reading intrinsic to the language of § 4(a)(2).  The clause reads, 
“or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.”  This 
language significantly enlarges the scope of activities prohibited 
by § 4(a)(2) as a whole, by extending to literally any acts that 
“otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.”  As the 
statute is currently structured, this clause functions as a 
protective, precautionary backstop.  In cases where the “deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual” clause has not been triggered, 
the “or otherwise adversely affects his status as an employee” 
clause ensures that § 4(a)(2) embraces practices that may not 
overtly deprive individuals of employment, but still operate as 
effective barriers.  Overall, this penultimate provision betrays 
the expansive and, arguably, overly inclusive tone of § 4(a)(2). 
Similarly, a comparison between the § 4(a)(2) and § 4(a)(3) of 
the ADEA reinforces this interpretation.  Addressing retaliatory 
actions, § 4(a)(3) makes it unlawful “to reduce the wage rate of 
 
94 See All. for Cmty. Media v. F.C.C., 529 F.3d 763, 779 (6th Cir. 2008). 
95 See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350–51 (1943) (limiting 
the application of ejusdem generis and expressio unius in the context of the 1933 Act 
on the basis “that courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its 
dominating general purpose . . . and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of 
the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally 
expressed legislative policy”).  
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any employee in order to comply with this chapter.”96  In 
§ 4(a)(3), “any” applies unambiguously to “employee,” in contrast 
to § 4(a)(2), which provides protections for “any individual,” carte 
blanche.  The difference between these neighboring provisions is 
glaring.  It can be inferred from this distinction that if Congress 
intended to restrict the object of “limit, segregate, or classify” to 
only current employees, then it would have—and could have—
done so, by substituting “any individual” for “any employee.” 
Despite this interpretation, the parties in Villarreal disputed 
whether “any individual” is the object of the verbs “limit, 
segregate, or classify,” or that the only object of these verbs is 
“his employees.”97  Robert Villarreal asserted that the verbs 
“limit, segregate, or classify” apply across the statute to “any 
individual,” even though “his employees” is the direct object of 
the three verbs.98  By contrast, RJR contended that the only 
object of the three verbs is “his employees,” and that “any 
individual” only refers to these employees—for example, “any 
individual” is modified by “his employees,” even though the terms 
are separated by eleven intervening words. 
But once again, the relationship between the verb “limit” and 
the object “his employees” overcomes this counterargument.  
Whether or not “any individual” serves as the object of “limit, 
segregate, or classify,” the core of the statute forbids actions that 
“limit[, segregate, or classify] his employees in any way . . . .”  
While this Note argues that “limit, segregate, or classify” applies 
across the whole statute, even without so concluding, the statute 
still addresses activities that “limit” employees on the basis of 
age discrimination.  Without question, then, hiring activities that 
have the effect of limiting employees necessarily encompasses job 
applicants for the statute to make logical sense, textually 
speaking. 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF DISJUNCTIVE CANONS:                                
THE 1972 AMENDMENTS TO TITLE VII AND ADEA CASE LAW 
The previous Part presented a textual analysis of § 4(a)(2) 
confirming that the unambiguous language of the ADEA permits 
disparate impact claims for job applicants.  While the plain 
 
96 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(3) (2012). 
97 See Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1293. 
98 See id. 
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meaning of § 4(a)(2) supports this conclusion, the case law 
interpreting the ADEA, and by extension, Title VII, affirms this 
reading as well.  The bulk of this case law concerns the role of the 
1972 amendment to Title VII.  With this amendment, Congress 
added the language, “or applicants for employment,” to the 
analogous provision of § 4(a)(2)—§ 703(a)(2) of Title VII.  To date, 
the ADEA has not been amended to conform with this revision to 
Title VII. 
The absence of the “applicants for employment” language 
from the ADEA has been read to bar job seekers from claiming 
disparate impact protections under the statute.99  This inference 
reflects a comparison to Title VII, with its explicit enumeration of 
applicants.  The comparative analysis suggests that if Congress 
intended for the ADEA to encompass job seekers under § 4(a)(2), 
then Congress would have inserted the phrase, “or applicants for 
employment,” as it did to Title VII in 1972.100  RJR advanced this 
exact claim in Villarreal.101 
While this language and its appearance in Title VII is 
significant its absence from the ADEA, in truth, is unavailing.  
This meaningful variation argument necessarily fails once one 
observes the substantive case law surrounding Title VII and the 
ADEA, as well as the legislative history of statutory amendments 
which has resulted in the textual distinction.102  First, since the 
inception of the federal employment discrimination laws, courts 
have interpreted the statutes in tandem, due to their shared text 
and shared purpose.103  This practice flows from the heavy 
presumption of interpretive commonality when the language and 
structure of one statute closely tracks the language and structure 
of another.104  Over the last fifty years, the relationship between 
Title VII and the ADEA, therefore, has been a symbiotic one of 
uniform interpretation.105  Jurists have sought to align these two 
 
99 See Villarreal I, No. 2:12-CV-0138-RWS, 2013 WL 823055, at *5 (N.D. Ga. 
Mar. 6, 2013); Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1308–09 (Vinson, J., dissenting); Gross v. 
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009). 
100 See Villarreal I, 2013 WL 823055, at *5–6. 
101 See Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1296–97. 
102 See infra notes 109–205 and accompanying text. 
103 See infra Part III.A. 
104 See infra notes 118–134 and accompanying text; see also Martin J. Katz, 
Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 857, 871 (2010) (“[T]he Gross Court rejected a 
perfectly reasonable and widely applied canon of construction—the presumption of 
uniformity—with no good reason for doing so.”). 
105 See infra Part III.A. 
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statutes rather than to differentiate them, with interpretation of 
the ADEA paralleling and informing that of Title VII, and vice-
versa.106  Thus, § 4(a)(2) authorizes disparate impact claims for 
applicants, in spite of the 1972 amendment to Title VII. 
Second, the nature of congressional amendments to Title VII 
and the ADEA does not overcome this interpretive practice, 
despite the inconsistent legislative history of the two statutes.  In 
particular, the process by which Congress enacts override 
amendments provides virtually no evidence for an intent to 
distinguish two closely related statutes if one text is amended, 
and the other is not.107  Therefore, the textual variation between 
the two statutes is not interpretively meaningful, and so the 
judicial practice of interpreting Title VII and the ADEA in pari 
passu and in pari matera should control in the context of 
§ 703(a)(2) and § 4(a)(2). 
A final reason for recognizing disparate impact claims for job 
seekers relates to the specific disposition of case law surrounding 
§ 4(a)(2).  Assuming arguendo that the 1972 congressional 
amendment to Title VII restricts disparate impact claims under 
the ADEA, the Supreme Court determined that disparate impact 
protections lie for job applicants under Title VII prior to the 1972 
amendment.108  Accordingly, the 1972 addition of “applicants for 
employment” to Title VII cannot serve as the legal basis for 
restricting disparate impact claims under the ADEA to only 
current employees.  This finding demonstrates that disparate 
impact claims extend to job applicants, under both statutes, 
historically and currently, and is bolstered by the judicial 
practice of maintaining interpretive unity between Title VII and 
the ADEA. 
 
 
 
 
106 See infra notes 123–134 and accompanying text. 
107 See infra notes 152–205 and accompanying text. 
108 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971). 
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A. The Canon of Uniformity for Title VII and the ADEA 
The ADEA, passed by Congress in 1967, took inspiration 
from Title VII, passed in 1964.109  The ADEA, itself, is closely 
modeled after Title VII.110  The ADEA owes its basic structure to 
Title VII, and derives the vast majority of its language, verbatim, 
from Title VII.111 
The close relationship between the two statutes has guided 
and informed judicial interpretation of the ADEA for decades.112  
Due to this shared textual DNA, the legal protections recognized 
under the ADEA closely mirror those available under Title VII.113  
Two examples are the disparate treatment cause of action and 
the disparate impact cause of action.114  In fact, the disparate 
treatment and disparate impact provisions within the ADEA are 
based entirely on the disparate treatment and disparate impact 
protections of Title VII.115 
 
 
109 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1975) (noting that 
Congress intended for the protections of Title VII and the ADEA “to eliminate, so far 
as possible, the last vestiges” of discrimination [in employment opportunities]). 
110 See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (“In fact, the prohibitions of 
the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII.”). 
111 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 333 (2005) (“[W]e begin with the 
premise that when Congress uses the same language in two statutes having similar 
purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after the other, it is appropriate 
to presume that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both 
statutes.”); Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584. 
112 See Katz, supra note 104, at 872. Katz contends that the Court attempted to 
unify the interpretive scheme for closely related statutes immediately preceding 
Gross. He proffers the example of Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 
incorporating the employment benefit standard under Title VII into the ADEA, as 
well as Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., in which the Court aligned union regulations 
under Title VII and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), given the same 
provisions in Title VII were derived in haec verba from the NLRA. See Goodman v. 
Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 688 (1987); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 
469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). 
113 See, e.g., Smith, 544 U.S. at 228. 
114 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); 29 USC § 623(a)(1), (2) (2012). 
115 See Trans World Airlines, Inc., 469 U.S. at 121 (1985) (finding employment 
benefits under the ADEA should mirror those under Title VII given the textual 
parity between the analogous provisions); Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of Memphis City 
Schs., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam) (finding that “a strong indication that 
the two statutes should be interpreted pari passu” when the language of one statute 
parallels that of another); see also Smith, 544 U.S. at 233–34 (“We have consistently 
applied that presumption to language in the ADEA that was ‘derived in haec verba 
from Title VII.’ ”) (quoting Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584). 
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At the same time, the language of § 703(a)(2) and § 4(a)(2) is 
identical, except that Title VII states, “it shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer . . . to limit, segregate, or 
classify his employees or applicants for employment . . . .”116  The 
remainder of the statute corresponds exactly to the language of 
the ADEA, excluding the final clause of “because of such 
individual’s age.”117  The only difference involves the “applicants 
for employment” clause of Title VII. 
In spite of this distinction, a long-established canon of 
construction requires courts to interpret closely related statutes 
with an eye towards conformity.118  Settled opinion recommends 
that “statutes which relate to the same subject matter,” that is, 
are in pari materia, “should be read, construed and applied 
together so that the legislature’s intention can be gathered from 
the whole of the enactments.”119  Leading authorities on statutory 
interpretation advocate this interpretive scheme.120  This 
approach respects the reality that statutes like Title VII and the 
ADEA share a common purpose, and so the use of similar, if not 
identical language suggests that the interpretation of these 
statutes align.121  Within the legislative context of derivative 
statutes, such as Title VII and the ADEA, the “canon of  
 
 
116 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
117 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012). 
118 See Lorrillard, 434 U.S. at 584; Northcross, 412 U.S. at 428. 
119 In pari materia, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990); Jamie Darin 
Prenkert, Bizarro Statutory Stare Decisis, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 217, 234 
(2007) (“When the legislature borrows language from one statute to draft a 
subsequent statute, courts generally agree that the statutes should be construed 
consistently.”); Caren Sencer, When a Boss Isn't an Employer: Limitations of Title 
VII Coverage, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 441, 466 (2004) (“Analysis of Title VII, 
the ADA, and ADEA is very closely integrated, as Title VII and [the] ADEA use the 
same definitions in most instances and many of those terms are explicitly 
incorporated into the ADA.”). 
120 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILLIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 282–85 (2000); William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Foreword, Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 27–
31 (1994). 
121 See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) 
(commenting that the ADEA and Title VII exhibit common substantive aspects, and 
serve common purposes); see also Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233–34 
(2005) (“We have consistently applied that presumption to language in the ADEA 
that was 'derived in haec verba from Title VII.' ”) (quoting Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 
584). 
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uniformity” ensures that language employed in one context—for 
example, racial discrimination—conveys the same meaning in 
other contexts—for example, age discrimination.122 
Along these lines, the record of the ADEA and Title VII 
jurisprudence has been one of equity and commonality, with 
courts interpreting the statutes in like fashion.123  The 2005 
ruling in Smith continued this legacy, recognizing for the first 
time disparate impact protections under the ADEA, which had 
first been established under Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co.124  Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion began by outlining the 
affinities between Title VII and the ADEA, owing to the textual 
parity between the two statutes.125  Justice Stevens even 
commented that “[e]xcept for the substitution of the word ‘age’ for 
the words ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,’ the 
language of [§ 4(a)(2)] in the ADEA is identical to that found in 
§ 703(a)(2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).”126  The 
opinion ventured as far as saying:  
In determining whether the ADEA authorizes disparate-impact 
claims, we begin with the premise that when Congress uses the 
same language in two statutes having [a] similar purpose[], 
particularly when one is enacted shortly after the other, it is 
appropriate to presume that Congress intended th[e] text to 
have the same meaning in both statutes.127   
While Justice Scalia’s concurrence, advocating for deference to 
the EEOC interpretation of § 4(a)(2), carried the 5-to-3 ruling, 
the principles articulated in Justice Steven’s opinion served as 
the raison d’être for the Court’s conclusions.128 
 
 
 
 
122 See Northcross, 412 U.S. at 428 (finding that “a strong indication that the 
two statutes should be interpreted pari passu” when the language of one statute 
parallels that of another). 
123 See Katz supra note 104, at 860–63. 
124 See Smith, 544 U.S. at 233. 
125 See id. Especially telling is the following pronouncement: “Griggs, which 
interpreted the identical text at issue here, thus strongly suggests that a disparate-
impact theory should be cognizable under the ADEA.” Id. at 236. 
126 See id. at 233. 
127 See id. 
128 See id. at 243–47 (Scalia, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist took no 
part in the judgment, thus the 5-to-3 ruling. 
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Likewise, the outcome under the ADEA in Meacham v. 
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory paralleled the ruling in Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,129 both addressing the burdens of 
proof for disparate impact claims under the sister statutes.130  In 
Meacham, the Court attempted to harmonize the causation 
standard of the ADEA with the burden-shifting framework of 
Title VII.131  At the time, Title VII required that an employer 
demonstrate that an alleged discriminatory practice was a “bona 
fide occupational qualification [“BFOQ”] reasonably necessary to 
the normal operation” of a business.132  However, the ADEA 
contains an explicit “reasonable factor other than age” (“RFOA”) 
provision, whereby the employer may assert an RFOA defense to 
exculpate itself.133  Still, in spite of the procedural distinction 
between the BFOQ and RFOA, the Court held that the RFOA 
provision is an affirmative defense, just as the BFOQ is an 
affirmative defense under Title VII.134  In other words, the Court 
aligned the burdens of proof under both statutes in Meacham, 
despite the incidental distinctions between the functionally 
analogous BFOQ and the RFOA provisions. 
B. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. and the Current Status 
of Override Amendments 
As shown in the rulings of Smith and Meacham, the Court 
continued to abide by this practice of interpreting the ADEA in 
pari materia with Title VII until recently.135  The Court departed 
from this course with its controversial ruling in Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc.136  The outcome in Gross drove an 
unprecedented wedge between Title VII and the ADEA, once 
again with respect to the burden-shifting framework of the two 
 
129  Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84 (2008); Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074. 
130 See Meacham, 554 U.S. at 91; Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660. 
131 See Meacham, 554 U.S. at 93. The Court sought to resolve the issue 
persisting since Smith regarding the “reasonable factor other than age” (“RFOA”) 
defense under the ADEA. Id. at 89–90. 
132 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2012). This standard is commonly referred to as 
the “business necessity test.” 
133 See Meacham, 554 U.S. at 92–93; see also id. at 87. 
134 See id. at 93–95. 
135 See Katz, supra note 104, at 858. 
136 557 U.S. 167, 169–70, 180 (2009). 
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statutes.137  Much like the arguments in Villarreal, the dispute in 
Gross centered on a textual disparity between Title VII and the 
ADEA owing to a congressional amendment of Title VII.138  To 
summarize, the majority in Gross inferred a congressional intent 
to distinguish the burdens of proof under the ADEA and Title VII 
based on Congress’s failure to amend the ADEA in tandem with 
Title VII.139 
In Gross, a fifty-four-year-old employee was reassigned from 
his managerial position to a “project coordinator” position, while 
his former responsibilities were reassigned to a younger 
colleague whom he had previously supervised.140  At trial, a 
dispute arose as to the jury instructions.141  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined that the 
instructions were incorrectly administered, based on the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.142  Price 
Waterhouse, itself, outlined the burden-shifting framework for 
disparate treatment claims under Title VII.143 
But, the Court in Gross repudiated the approach of both the 
trial court and the Eighth Circuit, basing its decision on the 
absence of language in the ADEA, which Congress had 
subsequently added to Title VII.144  The textual disparity 
stemmed from the 1991 Civil Rights Amendments (“1991 CRA”), 
 
137 See id. at 174–75. 
138 See id. at 185–86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Because the 1991 Act amended 
only Title VII and not the ADEA with respect to mixed-motives claims, the Court 
reasonably declines to apply the amended provisions to the ADEA.”). 
139 See id. at 174 (majority opinion) (“Congress neglected to add such a provision 
to the ADEA when it amended Title VII to add §§ 2000e–2(M) and 2000e–5(g)(2)(B), 
even though it contemporaneously amended the ADEA in several ways . . . .”). 
140 See id. at 170. 
141 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 2008). At the 
trial court level, the jury was instructed if Gross proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence that his age was a motivating factor for his demotion, then Gross should 
prevail, but if FBL Financial Services could then demonstrate that it would have 
reached the same result, absent his age, then the jury must find in FBL's favor. See 
id. 
142 490 U.S. 228, 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. 
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074. 
143 See id. at 248–250, 254. The Court in Price Waterhouse grappled with 
defining causation for Title VII disparate treatment claims, and more precisely, 
whether or not direct evidence of discrimination is required to shift the burden to 
the defendant in mixed-motive cases. Id. at 254. Justice O'Connor's decisive 
concurrence recommended the direct evidence requirement. Id. at 267–69 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring). 
144 See Gross, 577 U.S. at 172, 174–75. 
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which represented Congress’s response to the Price Waterhouse 
ruling.145  In this override amendment, Congress expressly 
rejected the direct evidence requirement for motivating factor 
discrimination, originally advocated in Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence.146  In addition to rejecting this aspect of the ruling, 
the 1991 CRA amended and clarified other aspects of Title VII in 
response to the parts of the Court’s decision with which it 
disagreed.147  During this process, Congress also included 
provisions amending the ADEA, but these revisions were 
unrelated to Price Waterhouse and the Title VII burden-shifting 
framework.148 
This congressional record proved dispositive for the Court in 
Gross, as Justice Thomas determined that neither the 1991 CRA 
provisions, nor the ruling in Price Waterhouse controlled in the 
context of the ADEA and the requisite burden of proof.149  Rather, 
the Court found that under the ADEA, “but-for” causation is the 
necessary burden, not the motivating factor standard 
promulgated by the 1991 CRA.150  To arrive at this conclusion, 
the Gross Court disposed of the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting 
framework for the ADEA on the basis that “Title VII is 
materially different [from the ADEA] with respect to the relevant 
burden of persuasion.”151  Prior to Gross, lower courts had already 
applied the Price Waterhouse framework to the ADEA since 
 
145 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
146 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 267–69. 
147 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) In addition to Price 
Waterhouse, the 1991 CRA sought to redress the ruling in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
148 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 115, 105 Stat. 1079 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (2012)); id. § 302, at 1088 (codified as 
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 1202 (2006)). These two amendments to the ADEA made it 
necessary for the EEOC to notify plaintiffs about the status of complaints filed with 
the agency, so that plaintiffs could commence a civil action within the statutorily-
required, ninety days. Id. 
149 See Gross, 577 U.S. at 178, 180. 
150 See id. at 177–78, 180. 
151 See id. at 173. Justice Thomas also justified his repudiation of the Price 
Waterhouse framework by contending “it is far from clear that the Court would have 
the same approach were it to consider the question today in the first instance.” Id. at 
178–79. In other words, he doubted that the Court would have derived the same 
framework in 2009 as it had in 1989 under the Price Waterhouse plurality. 
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1991.152  While the 1991 CRA undoubtedly controlled Title VII, 
the prevailing logic assumed that the burden-shifting provisions 
of Price Waterhouse persisted as to the ADEA and ADA.153 
The Court in Gross vitiated this practice of interpretive 
commonality, and the opinion attempted to delimit the scope of 
the 1991 Civil Rights Amendments across the employment 
discrimination statutes.154  Working from the assumption that 
Congress neglected to amend the ADEA when it could have done 
so in 1991, the Court inferred a congressional intent not to 
amend the ADEA as it had Title VII with the 1991 CRA.155  The 
Court articulated this tenet in the following passage: 
We cannot ignore Congress’ [sic] decision to amend Title VII’s 
relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the ADEA.  
When Congress uses certain language in one part of a statute 
and different language in another, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally.156 
It is clear, then, that the textual disparity engendered by the 
1991 CRA served as the lynchpin for the Court in Gross.  The 
inconsistent amendments to the ADEA and Title VII signaled to 
the Court that Congress intended to distinguish the burdens of 
proof under the two statutes.157  This novel insight thereby 
licensed Justice Thomas to synthesize a causation framework for 
the ADEA completely divorced from Title VII and Title VII case 
law.158 
The opinion in Gross forever changed the landscape of Title 
VII and its legislative progeny, namely the ADEA.  At the very 
least, the holding in Gross stands for the proposition that if 
Congress does not amend closely related statutes, in an identical 
fashion, then the amendment of the one statute is wholly 
 
152 See Charles A. Sullivan, The Curious Incident of Gross and the Significance 
of Congress's Failure to Bark, 90 TEX. L. REV. 157, 160 (2012). 
153 See id. at 159–60. 
154 Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra 
Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 860–61 (2012) [hereinafter 
Widiss, The Hydra Problem]. 
155 See Gross, 577 U.S. at 174–75. 
156 See id. at 174–75 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 
256 (1991)). 
157 See id. 
158 See id. at 179–80; see also Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the 
Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 511, 561 (2009) [hereinafter Widiss, Shadow Precedents]. 
FINAL_PIACENTE 6/16/2018  11:51 AM 
1030 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1005   
irrelevant to the other.159  More overtly, Gross infers a 
congressional intent for closely related statutes to evolve along 
different tracks when Congress fails to amend them 
identically.160  Projecting the logic of Gross onto the 
circumstances in Villarreal suggests that the absence of the 
“applicants for employment” from § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA 
evidences a congressional intent not to amend the ADEA in line 
with Title VII when it did so in 1972.  As a result, this textual 
inconsistency manifests a congressional intent to distinguish the 
scope of disparate impact claims under the two statutes. 
All that being said, the ruling in Gross has been widely 
criticized for its cavalier approach to interpreting the override 
amendment in the context of closely related statutes.161  
Commentators have noted that the ruling presents a “turn-about 
on the value of uniformity in employment discrimination law,” 
reversing a canon of uniformity which has guided jurisprudence 
in this arena.162  Similarly, employment discrimination expert, 
Deborah Widiss, takes issue with the long-term implications of 
Gross, writing, “[t]he rule of interpretation that the Court 
announced in Gross is radically asymmetrical” with respect to 
closely related statutes.163  These assessments outline the broad 
problems that have emerged from the Gross decision.  Overall, 
the ruling ignores the overwhelming judicial, constitutional, and  
 
 
159 See Gross, 577 U.S. at 174. 
160 See id. Contra Villarreal II, 806 F.3d 1288, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(“Congress has all kinds of reasons for passing laws, and presumably all kinds of 
reasons for not passing laws as well. The 1972 change to Title VII was part of a 
broad revamp of the statute aimed at expanding the jurisdiction and power of the 
EEOC . . . . We will not assume that Congress chose not to pass legislation modifying 
the ADEA simply because it did make this one change in a broader restructuring of 
Title VII.”). 
161 See, e.g., Meghan C. Cooper, Reading Between the Lines: The Supreme 
Court's Textual Analysis of the ADEA in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 45 
NEW. ENG. L. REV. 753, 765–66 (2011) (“This declaration [Gross] flies in the face of 
decades of precedent and language by the Court to the contrary.”); Melissa Hart, 
Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court's 2008–09 Labor and Employment Cases, 
13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 253, 273–74 (2009) (“The substantive outcome in Gross 
is not good for employment discrimination plaintiffs. The way the Court got there is 
not good for the law.”); Katz, supra note 104, at 871 (“The Gross Court rejected a 
perfectly reasonable and widely applied canon of construction—the presumption of 
uniformity—with no good reason for doing so.”). 
162 See Katz, supra note 104, at 857–58. 
163 Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154 at 860–61. 
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purposivist rationales that recommend courts analyze closely 
related statutes according to a uniform scheme of interpretation, 
in spite of textual disparities owing to intermittent amendments. 
As an initial matter, the holding in Gross overlooks the 
practical limitations of the statutory override.  Generally 
speaking, a legislative override represents an attempt by 
Congress to overrule, clarify, or curtail a ruling of the federal 
courts.164  Most congressional overrides address individual 
judicial decisions, not the overarching legal principles implicated 
by a given opinion.165  For decades, Congress has relied on the 
statutory override as a means of reversing specific rulings it 
sought to invalidate or qualify.166  In other words, the 
congressional override does not function as a remedial device for 
correcting every potential interpretive ill introduced by the 
Court.167  Rather, it is responsive to distinct judicial opinions, 
which in themselves pertain to isolated statutory provisions.168 
The history of legislative amendments to Title VII and the 
ADEA confirms this finding.  Congress has amended the 
employment discrimination statutes in reaction to Supreme 
Court rulings on a statute-by-statute and case-by-case basis.169  It 
has not amended one statute based on a ruling related to another 
statute, albeit a closely related one.  As just one ready example, 
the ADEA has consistently been amended in response to 
Supreme Court rulings on the ADEA, not rulings on Title VII, or 
the ADA, or the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.170  More 
 
164 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 332 n.1 (1991) (“A congressional 
'override' includes a statute that: (1) completely overrules the holding of a statutory 
interpretation decision . . . (2) modifies the result of a decision in some material 
way . . . or (3) modifies the consequences of the decision. . . .”). Eskridge, a leading 
scholar on statutory interpretation, repeats this definition elsewhere. Matthew R. 
Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court 
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967—2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2014).  
165 See Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 164, at 1319–20. 
166 See id.; Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154, at 895 (emphasis in 
original) (“In all of these overrides, Congress amended only the statute actually 
interpreted in the prior judicial interpretation.”). 
167 See Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154, at 930. 
168 See id. 
169 See id.; Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 164, at 1319–20. 
170 See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. 
L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (responding to United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 
(1977)); Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-521, 104 Stat. 
2287 (responding to Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 
158 (1989)). See also Jessica Sturgeon, Smith v. City of Jackson: Setting an 
FINAL_PIACENTE 6/16/2018  11:51 AM 
1032 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1005   
importantly, this record contradicts the inferential argument 
outlined in Gross; the congressional override is a highly and 
deliberatively narrow legislative transaction.  Without any 
question, override amendments have never been mobilized to 
redress the far-reaching consequences of the Court’s rulings 
across a series of statutes.171 
Yet, the holding in Gross now imposes on the legislative 
branch the burden of formally amending similar statutes to avoid 
the inference of congressional neglect.172  Under this scheme, 
subcommittees must canvass the federal code and evaluate 
whether or not to amend these closely related laws in tandem, 
wholesale, piecemeal, or not at all.173  But again, this 
requirement disregards the function of the override as a 
narrowly-construed, corrective measure, and it ignores the 
practical realities of the amendment enactment process.174  
Otherwise, Congress would be performing a prophylactic 
function, whereas the override process is necessarily 
responsive.175  The burden is simply too immense for a Congress 
preoccupied by a host of more urgent affairs.176  Requiring 
Congress to implement trans-statutory amendments for a group 
of closely related statutes would frustrate a prime interest in 
efficiency contemplated by the override.177 
 
Unreasonable Standard, 56 DUKE L.J. 1377, 1395 (2007) (“The 1991 amendments to 
Title VII were not accompanied by corresponding changes to the ADEA. However, 
Wards Cove was a Title VII decision, not a decision under the ADEA.”). 
171 See Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154, at 930. 
172 See Prenkert, supra note 119, at 255. 
173 See id. 
174 See Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154, at 923. Widiss uses the 
terminology “blanket” amendment to describe this trans-statutory amendment 
procedure. 
175 See Eskridge, supra note 164, at 332 n.1. 
176 See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 158, at 564–65. 
177 See id. at 564; Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154, at 861–62. (“This 
approach improperly cabins the effects of congressional overrides and dramatically 
aggrandizes the judicial role . . . . It distorts the separation of powers, making it 
difficult for overrides to serve their intended role as a check on judicial law 
making . . . .”). Moreover, there is the risk of congressional oversight implicated by 
this procedure. It is conceivable that at least some of the statutes within a family of 
statutes might escape congressional attention during these more comprehensive 
amendment deliberations. See Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154, at 890. 
Under the ruling in Gross, the Court would infer from this inadvertent omission an 
intent to ignore the given law, despite a purely unintended mistake. And while 
seemingly administrable, the procedure of reverting back to historical 
interpretations of Title VII presents various practical challenges. See E.E.O.C. v. 
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At the same time, these reservations concerning 
burdensome, trans-statutory amendment process invoke 
constitutional matters of legislative supremacy.  Arguably, the 
holding in Gross disturbed the balance of power between 
Congress and the judiciary with respect to overrides.178  The 
Court in Gross inferred from the inconsistent amendment history 
that Congress intended for the burdens of proof under Title VII 
and the ADEA to diverge.179  However, the Gross ruling 
overlooked evidence of Congress’s intent to apply the motivating 
factor standard outlined in the CRA to the ADEA.180  Instead, the 
Court assumed a more pronounced role, which contradicted 
congressional will.181  The Gross opinion set forth a dangerous 
precedent which authorized the Court to substitute its 
interpretation for that of Congress, rejecting the deferential 
stance of previous decades in the wake of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.182 
For these discrete reasons, the Gross opinion proves 
unpersuasive for interpreting § 4(a)(2) and the scope of disparate 
impact under the ADEA.  First, the Court in Gross disregarded 
the interpretive scheme of uniformity which has guided and 
informed adjudication of closely related statutes for decades.  In 
addition, the opinion incorrectly construed a statutory override 
addressing just one ruling and installed it as a talisman of 
legislative intent for other statutes.  Again, the nature of the 
congressional override as a direct, efficient response to an 
isolated ruling does not function as a broad panacea that the  
 
 
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256 (1991). The Arabian American decision was 
itself overridden by congressional amendment. For instance, plaintiffs often bring 
claims under the ADEA and Title VII simultaneously, but now courts must apply 
divergent standards of proof or causes of action. See Katz, supra note 104, at 865. 
The disjunction of burdens under Gross overcomplicates pleading requirements 
within the tightly-knit landscape of federal employment discrimination law. See id. 
at 867; Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154, at 860–61. 
178 See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 158, at 560–61. 
179 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009). The Court 
rejected the causation standard under Price Waterhouse, expressing its disfavor for 
direct evidence requirements in Justice O'Connor's concurrence. 
180 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 
697. The Committee Report for the 1991 CRA states that Congress “intends that 
these other laws modeled after Title VII be interpreted consistently in a manner 
consistent with Title VII as amended by this Act.” Id. 
181 See id. 
182 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
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Court presumed in Gross.  Third, the trans-statutory amendment 
process stipulated by the Court frustrates legislative purposes, 
and invokes the possibility of a constitutional imbalance. 
This robust critique of Gross suggests that job applicants 
may assert disparate impact claims under the ADEA, despite the 
textual disparity owing to the 1972 amendment of Title VII.  And 
the case study of Gross even leaves open the possibility that 
Congress intended the 1972 amendment of Title VII to distribute 
across the employment discrimination statutes, just as the 
Committee Report for the 1991 CRA discloses a similar intent for 
those amendments. 
But perhaps most importantly, the canon of uniformity 
overcomes the arguments predicated on the textual disparity 
between the statutes.  As discussed above, the congressional 
override amending one statute reveals little of Congress’s intent 
to either amend or fail to amend another statute.  Given this, the 
presumption persists that for closely related statutes which 
share nearly identical language and serve a common purpose—
for example, combatting employment discrimination—jurists 
should interpret these provisions uniformly.  Therefore, § 4(a)(2) 
of the ADEA supports disparate impact claims for job applicants. 
IV. GRIGGS, THE HYDRA, AND THE STATUS OF DISPARATE IMPACT 
CLAIMS UNDER THE ADEA 
Despite scholarly misgivings, Gross still stands as good law.  
Therefore, its precepts on inconsistent amendments and 
congressional neglect controls subsequent interpretation of the 
ADEA.  The procedure for interpreting override amendments 
found in Gross should necessarily inform the interpretation of 
§ 4(a)(2) of the ADEA.  This is precisely why the absence of any 
discussion of Gross in the Eleventh Circuit’s revised ruling is so 
conspicuous. 
The outcome in Gross reflects a phenomenon called the 
“hydra problem” in statutory interpretation.183  The “hydra 
problem” emerges when Congress overrides a judicial opinion 
with respect to one statute, but does not amend closely related 
statutes implicated by the decision.184  The congressional override 
for the one law thus “sever[s] . . . a head”—or branch—of case law 
 
183 Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154, at 863. 
184 See id. 
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which previously applied to the amended statute—that is the 
1991 CRA with respect to Title VII and Price Waterhouse.185  
However, because Congress invalidates these rulings with the 
override, a “new [judicial] head” must evolve to interpret the 
otherwise identical, though, unamended closely related law(s), 
which Congress did not amend in a similar fashion.186  As a 
result, “an entirely divorced parallel path of case law . . . that no 
longer control[s] [the amended statute] . . . [is] deemed to control 
the interpretation of [the] related statutes” which have not been 
amended.187  
This paradigm mirrors the holding in Gross.  The Court 
traced back the family tree of dormant Title VII case law to 
identify the standard that controlled the ADEA prior to Price 
Waterhouse and the 1991 CRA, namely, but-for causation.188  
Thus, a new precedential “head”—or judicial branch—developed 
to determine the proper standard of causation under the ADEA.  
This had the effect of reviving otherwise moot rulings, which now 
form the divergent branch of ADEA-employment-discrimination 
case law.  The causation standard under the ADEA is now 
entirely disconnected from the current Title VII burdens, as well 
as the Price Waterhouse opinion which the 1991 CRA overruled.   
The ruling in Villarreal is itself symptomatic of the hydra 
problem.  The 1972 amendment to Title VII—adding “applicants 
for employment” language—requires that a new, precedential 
strain of case law emerge for the purposes of defining the scope of 
disparate impact claims under the ADEA.  Oddly enough, the 
Eleventh Circuit declined any invitation to trace back the family 
tree of Title VII, and revive pre-1972 case law. 
 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 877–78. 
187 Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 158, at 561; Sullivan, supra note 152, 
at 157–58. Sullivan, summarizing Widiss, explains it in simplified terms: 
This scenario arises when the Court construes Statute A in a way in which 
Congress disapproves, and Congress responds by amending Statue A, 
without formally amending analogous Statute B to like effect. When the 
same interpretive question then arises under Statute B, the Court finds 
that Congress's failure to amend Statute B conveys a legislative intent that 
the two should be read differently. This is the “hydra problem”—Congress's 
override of a judicial interpretation with which it disagreed (“the 
metaphorical severing of a head”) justifies a different interpretation (“the 
rapid growth of new head”) of other, unamended statutes. 
Id. 
188 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009). 
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All that being said, the Gross paradigm generates an 
interesting result when deployed in the context of disparate 
impact claims under the ADEA, because jurists will arrive back 
at Griggs v. Duke Power Co.189  The controversy in Griggs 
centered on qualifying standards within an employee transfer 
program.190  African American plaintiffs in Griggs alleged that 
the required qualifications, such as a high school diploma and 
various aptitude standards, functioned as barriers to their 
advancement.191  The Court analogized the diploma and aptitude 
thresholds to literacy tests administered to limit the black 
franchise.192  Ultimately, it reached the conclusion that disparate 
impact claims are cognizable under § 703(a)(2) of Title VII.193 
As the watershed for disparate impact in employment 
discrimination, Griggs lends ample support to the argument that 
disparate impact claims are cognizable for job applicants under 
§ 4(a)(2) of the ADEA.  Even if the procedure in Gross is followed, 
the language of Justice Burger’s opinion compels the finding that 
disparate impact under the ADEA encompasses job applicants.  
Justice Burger announced, “Congress has now required that the 
posture and condition of the job-seeker be taken into account,” 
recalling that Griggs pertained to an employee transfer 
program.194  Justice Burger continued, “If an employment 
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be 
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.”195  Thus, 
the Court in Griggs unequivocally held that disparate impact 
claims extend to job applicants under Title VII, absent the 1972 
Amendments to Title VII.196  In fact, the Court drew no 
distinction between current and prospective employees, although 
the plaintiffs in that case were current employees of Duke 
Power.197 
 
189 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). 
190 Id. at 427–28. 
191 Id. at 428–29. 
192 Id. at 430. 
193 See id. at 431. 
194 Id. (emphasis added). 
195 Id. (emphasis added) (“What is required by Congress is the removal of 
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers 
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible 
classification.” (emphasis added)). 
196 See id. at 436. 
197 See id. at 429–30. 
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In the end, Griggs proves dispositive for settling the present 
dispute over disparate impact protections under the ADEA.  The 
Court delivered the Griggs ruling in 1971.  However, Congress 
only added the key phrase of “applicants for employment,” in 
1972.198  This chronology is crucial.  According to the ruling in 
Gross, the decision in Griggs must govern the interpretation of 
disparate impact claims under § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA, because 
Griggs constitutes the relevant case law controlling Title VII 
disparate impact protections prior to the 1972 amendment.  Yet, 
the Court in Griggs fully reached and resolved the question of 
whether disparate impact protections encompass job applicants 
in the affirmative:  Job applicants enjoy these protections as 
much as current employees do under Title VII. 
So, despite even the best attempt to distinguish Title VII and 
the ADEA in Gross, with its inference of intent from 
congressional inaction, the interpretive framework of Gross 
points back to Griggs, and the inescapable conclusion that job 
seekers are entitled to disparate impact protections under the 
ADEA.  Thus, Gross itself compels the conclusion that disparate 
impact claims lie for job applicants under both statutes, because, 
regardless of the procedure required by Gross, the Court in 
Griggs broadly outlined the scope of disparate impact in the 
absence of the “applicants for employment” amendment.  This, 
itself, fully confirms the finding that job seekers enjoy disparate 
impact protection under § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, disparate impact claims 
ought to be cognizable for job applicants under the ADEA.  This 
conclusion depends on the plain meaning of the statute, the 
“canon of uniformity” for closely related statutes, the disposition 
of case law surrounding the ADEA, practical considerations on 
override amendments, and, finally, the outcome in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co.  Ironically—and that is the appropriate word—
the ruling in Gross only assists this position, rather than 
 
198 See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 8, 
§ 703(a)(2), 86 Stat. 109 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012)). In 
ratifying the Act, the report attached to the bill declared, “The promises of equal job 
opportunity made in 1964 must be made realities.” S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 8 (1971). 
Once again, the legislative history explicitly references the job search process and 
applicants. 
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hindering it.  And even if the preceding arguments prove wholly 
unconvincing, this Note has not even addressed the official 
EEOC interpretation of § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA, which authorizes 
job applicants to bring disparate impact claims, and which served 
as the basis for the first Eleventh Circuit ruling in Villarreal, 
which relied on Auer deference.199 
Just recently, the North District of California held that job 
applicants may assert disparate impact claims under the ADEA, 
in contravention of the second Eleventh Circuit ruling in 
Villarreal.  There, in Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, the 
plaintiffs brought a class action against the accounting firm, 
alleging “ ‘systemic and pervasive discrimination against older 
job applicants.’ ”200  The district court took full cognizance of the 
arguments found in Villarreal, and yet arrived at the conclusion 
that the disparate impact provision under the ADEA 
encompasses job seekers.201  In fact, the court commented that 
“Defendant’s [PricewaterhouseCooopers] statutory 
comparison . . . cannot overcome the use of the phrase ‘any 
individual’ ” in § 4(a)(2).202  On the topic of the 1972 amendment 
to Title VII, Judge Tigar confirmed that the congressional action 
after Griggs, in reality, bolsters the current position that 
disparate impact claims lie for job seekers: 
Defendant draws the wrong inference.  As Plaintiffs [Rabin et 
al.] point out, the amendment to Title VII was intended to be 
“declaratory of the present law,” and “fully in accord with the 
decision of the Court” in Griggs.  In other words, the 
amendment signaled that Griggs had properly interpreted Title 
VII as protecting both employees and applicants.  Therefore, the  
 
 
199  Under the standard in Auer, an agency is permitted to interpret ambiguous 
terms found its own regulations, and such agency interpretations are entitled to 
deference “unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer v. 
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). To be sure, the EEOC regulations of § 4(a)(2) 
explain that “[a]ny employment practice that adversely affects individuals within 
the protected age group on the basis of older age is discriminatory unless the 
practice is justified by a ‘reasonable factor other than age.’ ” 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c). 
See Villarreal II, 806 F.3d 1288, 1299 (11th Cir. 2015).  
200 Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 
2017). 
201 Id. at 1129. 
202 Id. 
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amendment supports, rather than detracts from, an 
interpretation of the ADEA as likewise covering both employees 
and applicants.203 
Accordingly, the issue persists as to whether the ADEA enables 
disparate impact protections for job applicants, and other jurists 
have endorsed the precise arguments offered in this Note. 
As a final comment, the purpose and tone of the ADEA 
contemplates the challenges face by older Americans in securing 
employment.  A House committee report from 1967 confirms that 
a chief purpose of the statute is to provide “a much-needed 
vigorous, nationwide campaign to promote hiring without 
discrimination on the basis of age.”204  The Wirtz Report, itself 
the impetus for enacting the ADEA, contains similar mandates.  
The following passage is most illustrative: 
There is . . . no harsher verdict in most men’s lives than 
someone else’s judgment that they are no longer worth their 
keep.  It is then, when the answer at the hiring gate is “You’re 
too old,” that a man turns away, in [a] poet’s phrase, finding 
“nothing to look backward to with pride, nothing forward to 
with hope.”205 
Evidently, it was the intent of the drafters for such protections to 
reach all individuals for which the law is applicable. 
Given these commentaries, the conclusion that the ADEA 
allows for broad disparate impact claims is hardly a strained one.  
Thus, the disparate impact provision of the ADEA, § 4(a)(2), 
enables disparate impact claims for job applicants. 
 
 
203 Id. at 1131. 
204 H.R. REP. NO. 90-805, at 2214 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 
2214. 
205 Wirtz, supra note 7, at 1 (referencing Robert Frost’s The Death of the Hired 
Man). 
